Criminal Justice in the Information Age by Robinson, Paul H.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
3-1-2004 
Criminal Justice in the Information Age 
Paul H. Robinson 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Robinson, Paul H., "Criminal Justice in the Information Age" (2004). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 41. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/41 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Criminal Justice in the Information Age: 
A Punishment Theory Paradox 
 
 
Paul H. Robinson* 
 
I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has established a national DNA database.  
All states are contributing to it, submitting DNA exemplars from persons sent to 
prison or even arrested.1  As the list of database-solved criminal cases grows, one can 
expect pressure to broaden the pool of offenders or potential offenders from which 
exemplars are taken.  With the availability of even faster computers and the 
decreasing cost and increasing reliability of DNA testing, it is not too difficult to 
imagine a future in which any body scraping or remnant—a hair or body fluid, such as 
a smear of sweat—left at a crime scene will be enough to generate a specific name 
and address. 
DNA advances are just one source of increased crime fighting power in the 
information age.  Video surveillance cameras are increasingly used in public and 
private spaces.  They are now common in England and in much of Europe.2  Advances 
in facial recognition and photo enhancement technology allow quicker creation and 
distribution of more accurate images of suspects.3  Special software helps criminal 
investigators organize information and search it for leads.4  The use of global 
positioning satellites makes it possible to track potential and past offenders.5  
Developments in encryption technology allow government to better investigate white 
collar offenses in which a computer is used.6  Advances in infrared technology allow 
more effective yet undisclosed police searches.7  Improved fingerprint technology8 
and the development of new biometric markers—scent and voice prints—increase 
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investigators’ power to identify suspects.9 
One can imagine a world, even within a democratic society that values personal 
privacy, in which high clearance rates (the rate at which police identify and arrest a 
suspect for reported offenses) are the norm and in which the availability of reliable 
evidence produces high prosecution and conviction rates—in other words, a world in 
which most crimes are solved and most perpetrators caught and punished. 
The possibility of such a future suggests it is worth considering this question:  
What would criminal law look like in a high-punishment-rate world, and how would it 
differ from what it is today? 
 
II. A SKETCH OF THE CURRENT CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE 
PROPER DISTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND PUNISHMENT 
 
A standard long-running dispute in criminal law pits those who want to distribute 
liability and punishment in the way that most effectively (and efficiently) avoids 
future crime (commonly called the “crime control” view) against those who want to 
distribute punishment according to the moral desert of the offender (commonly called 
the “desert” view). 
The primary mechanisms of the crime control view are deterrence and 
incapacitation.  That is, that view seeks to distribute liability and punishment in a way 
that most effectively deters future offenders by threat of punishment, or in a way that 
most effectively incapacitates those who are not likely to be deterred. 
The crime control view is criticized by desert advocates because distributive 
principles of deterrence and incapacitation would impose punishment according to 
criteria that desert theorists think unjust.  Greater punishment in high-profile cases 
makes good deterrence sense—maximizing the deterrent effect of the punishment 
dollar—but violates principles of desert because it does not track an offender’s degree 
of moral blameworthiness.  Giving long prison terms to young offenders who commit 
minor offenses but who are predicted to offend more seriously in the future makes 
good incapacitation sense but again violates desert. (The effects can be the reverse as 
well:  incapacitation theory might not waste punishment on a serious offense that will 
not reoccur, but a desert distribution might insist on it.) 
In other words, a crime control distribution is criticized because it either does 
injustice or fails to do justice.  A desert distribution is criticized because it allows 
avoidable crime—those offenses that could have been deterred or that could have 
been avoided by incapacitating the dangerous.10 
Crime control principles are also criticized on their own terms:  A deterrence 
distributive principle makes little sense, some argue, because manipulation of rules to 
maximize deterrence has little chance of having an effect, in large part because the 
deterrent threat of the present criminal justice system is so ineffective.  The present 
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criminal justice system is a sieve: many offenses are not reported, often because the 
police are seen as impotent to do anything; most reported offenses are not cleared (no 
arrest is made); and of those arrested, most are not convicted (and of those convicted, 
many are not punished).  The end result is a low likelihood of getting punished for an 
offense.  In rough terms, a person contemplating a rape faces a 12% chance of going 
to prison for that offense.  Robbery presents less than a 4% chance.  Assault, burglary, 
larceny, and motor vehicle theft are each a 100-to-1 shot.  Many potential offenders 
will not be deterred by these threats.11 
An incapacitation principle, in turn, is unwise, some argue, because under present 
conditions it would be inefficient and costly, both economically and morally.  The 
criticism focuses primarily on the high false positive rate of predictions of future 
criminality—commonly two of three.  Thus, three times as many people must be 
incarcerated as actually present a risk.  In our present system, that means a staggering 
cost of incarceration.  And the human cost also is high.  When the proportion of 
incarcerated persons in any given community reaches a significant level, it can cause 
significant social dislocation (as in the District of Columbia, for example, where a 
significant proportion of black males in their twenties and thirties are under criminal 
justice system control at any given time).  At the same time, it is also argued that 
using the criminal justice system as a preventive device provides poor social 
protection because of the logical constraints inherent in cloaking such preventive 
detention as criminal justice.12 
The crime control picture is considerably more complex than this; I have just 
sketched the broad contours of the debate as background. 
This continuing struggle between desert and crime control has resulted in a 
criminal justice system whose governing principles might be summarized this way:  
Desert commonly has more influence than crime control in assigning criminal 
liability, but the two share control of sentencing. 
But if the information age did bring high clearance and conviction rates, one 
might predict that this would all change.  Such a world would provide the conditions 
for a true and effective deterrent threat.  Even a 50% likelihood of getting convicted 
and punished would make the deterrent threat real.  And there is a spill-over benefit 
that supports use of the incapacitation mechanism:  As more people are deterred, the 
population of undeterred people requiring incapacitation grows smaller and, therefore, 
the costs of such a program—financial and human—become more feasible.  One 
might predict, then, that an information age of high punishment rates would bring the 
crime control principles to their strong point and have them dominate desert as the 
distributive principle. 
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This is where things get interesting.  I think it is possible that just the opposite 
may occur:  The conditions that make crime control mechanisms finally relevant and 
even powerful, also ultimately may render such mechanisms obsolete as distributive 
principles.  That is, the success of crime control mechanisms may paradoxically lead 
to the dominance of desert as a distributive principle. 
 
III. THE PARADOX: CRIME CONTROL SUCCESS PROMOTES THE  
DOMINATION OF DESERT? 
 
Why might the success of crime control mechanisms promote the dominance of 
desert?  First, consider that an increased probability of punishment increases the 
deterrent threat of all punishment, even that distributed according to a desert principle. 
That is, even a desert system gets the benefit of improved deterrence.  A pure 
deterrence-based system might deter even more, but the deterrent advantage of such a 
system over a desert distribution lies only in its marginal increase in deterrent 
effectiveness, which may remain as limited as it is today.  To prefer a deterrence 
distribution, one must conclude that the additional deterrence coming from those 
instances in which deterrence violates desert outweighs the societal interest in 
distributing liability and punishment according to desert. 
At the same time, a more effective deterrent threat is likely to result in a reduced 
public concern about crime generally.  The deterrent effectiveness inherent in even a 
desert distribution might well be enough to cause crime to fade as the significant 
social problem that it is today.  It would be easier to justify injustice necessary for 
crime control in a world where crime is out of control than in one in which crime is no 
longer a serious problem. 
Of course, this analysis assumes there is some inherent value in having a desert 
distribution.  Certainly the retributivists think so.  And there also are utilitarian 
arguments in support of a desert distribution, as I have sketched elsewhere.13  But in 
this Commentary, I make a prediction about what will happen, not what should.  My 
grounds for thinking that there will be some natural preference for a desert distribution 
comes from social science research that seems to suggests that desert is the “default” 
criterion that people naturally prefer in the distribution of criminal liability and 
punishment.  It is an actor’s perceived blameworthiness, as reflected in the extent of 
the person’s culpability and the harm caused, for example, rather than the prediction 
of future harms that might be avoided or the factors relevant to effective deterrence, 
that naturally guide people’s judgment about how much punishment should be 
imposed.14 
This suggests that people’s distributive preferences may be altered by 
contemporary conditions.  If they feel threatened and embattled, they may think 
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justice is a luxury they cannot afford.  But as punishment rates go up and crime rates 
go down, the fading sense of fear may make people feel that justice is a luxury they 
can afford again. 
 
 
 
